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A B S T R A C T   
In recent years, an increasing amount of solar energy has been produced around the globe, but too few consumers 
actually buy it. Three studies now show how this purchase can be promoted with an approach similar to the 
carbon offset program in aviation. After a fictitious purchase of differently priced appliances (e.g. electric 
toothbrush or TV set) in an online store, participants could buy a solar certificate for this appliance, whereby its 
price depended on the appliance’s energy consumption as well as the selected term (e.g. 1 or 3 years) of the 
certificate. By purchasing such a certificate, the amount of solar energy consumed by this appliance for the 
selected term would be fed into the Swiss electricity grid. Study 1 showed that participants were willing to buy 
such a certificate, especially certificates with longer terms. That willingness, however, depended on the “solar 
certificate price/appliance price” ratio. While Study 2 showed that this purchase is influenced by promotions (e.g., 
a specific reduction in price), Study 3 showed that this purchase did not lead to a less environmentally friendly 
behavior afterwards. Appliance-based solar certificates easily available at the point of sale can encourage con-
sumers to buy more solar energy.   
1. Introduction 
The statement “far too few consumers buy solar power” (Witschi, 
2017) by Susanne Thoma, the boss of one of the largest energy providers 
in Switzerland, indicates that too few people are switching to (i.e., 
buying) solar power. Incidentally, this observation applies not only to 
solar energy, but to renewable energies in general in many countries 
around the globe (see MacDonald and Eyre, 2018). The need to persuade 
consumers to buy solar power will increase as, in many countries, there 
is not only a large, so far unused, potential of solar energy (Kabir et al., 
2018), through production on house roofs (so-called residential solar 
electricity) for example, which could be fed into the local power grid, 
but this energy potential is also expected to double between 2018 and 
2024 (International Energy Agency, 2019). This raises the question: 
Why are consumers not switching to or buying renewable electricity in 
general and solar energy in particular? 
One reason why too few consumers switch to renewable electricity is 
financial. For example, consumers simply overestimate the additional 
costs of switching to renewable electricity. In Tabi et al.’s (2014) study, 
consumers were expecting additional costs of, on average, 10% (similar 
results were found by Kühne et al., 2020), although they actually ranged 
in between 0% and 5% (MacDonald and Eyre, 2018). Thereby, con-
sumers are potentially willing to pay more for solar power than for any 
other type of energy (e.g., Borchers et al., 2007; Cicia et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, consumers also overestimate the electricity used by their 
appliances and therefore the costs that arise therefrom (Attari et al., 
2010; Kempton et al., 1985). It is assumed that charging a smartphone 
100 times costs 10 euros - that is 17 times the actual average charging 
price (see the online survey from E. ON, 2018). 
However, from a scientific point of view, it is not surprising that 
consumers cannot accurately estimate prices. This is simply because 
they do not have an internal value meter that shows them, for example, 
the absolute price (e.g. 35 CHF/month) of a solar power product. Prices 
are – like many other things – always set in relation to “something else”. 
Hence, consumers might just know that solar power is more expensive 
than grey energy,1 and set the price accordingly. The problem, however, 
is that the price of this so-called reference product is already set arbi-
trarily. This implies that the setting of its price is vulnerable to envi-
ronmental or irrelevant factors such as an anchor price. For example, 
depending on the price of the car you might have just bought, you may 
accept a higher/lower price for grey energy (the price of a bottle of wine 
has a similar effect on the choice of your menu in a restaurant, see 
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Ariely, 2008). As a consequence, a large number of different estimated 
reference prices should be found among consumers (see Kühne et al., 
2020 for a confirmation of this). A reference price for grey electricity 
that is too high will then also drive up the expected price for solar en-
ergy. Last but not least, once a price expectation has been set, such as 
solar electricity is “expensive“, it can no longer be changed except at 
great expense (Ariely, 2008, summarizes this under his concept of 
arbitrary coherence). 
How can we still persuade consumers to buy solar power? Research 
has now shown that not only price expectations are influenced by 
irrelevant factors, but also the product itself, or the assessment of its 
value or quality. This is especially true in the case of so-called low- 
involvement products. That is, products whose “perceived relevance of 
the subject matter based on inherent needs, values and interests” 
(Zaichkowsky 1985, p. 342) is low in the eyes of the consumer. 
Low-involvement products are, for example, food and beverage items. 
Hence, Velasco et al. (2013) have shown, that the perceived sensory 
characteristics of a whisky was influenced by the environment in which 
it was consumed. In other words, these irrelevant factors can also change 
the favorability of the product itself and thus alter the decision for or 
against it. This is most likely possible since one characteristic of these 
products is that they are quite homogeneous, that is, with not much 
variation in value (Van der Laan et al., 2012). Energy is also considered a 
“low-involvement product” (Watson et al., 2002) because its only value 
variation for the consumer is of an altruistic nature, but the product itself 
(the electricity that comes out of your socket) is no different between 
renewable and fossil energy. This is leading to inertia when it comes to 
changing or buying another (more renewable) energy product. 
So what is the potential of these findings? The knowledge that “low 
involvement products” or their value or quality evaluation are suscep-
tible to irrelevant factors implies that they are processed automatically 
or intuitively (or by System 1 in Kahneman’s thermology, 2011); this in 
contrast to products with high involvement (e.g. a car). This makes 
decisions between low-involvement products sensitive to any kind of 
nudge intervention. A nudge is a simple change in people’s 
decision-making environment to change their behavior in a predictable 
way (see Thaler and Sunstein, 2009). For example, by putting the default 
on the renewable energy option instead of the grey energy (see Kühne 
et al., 2020, or Pichert and Katsikopulus, 2008), more consumers choose 
the renewable energy option. Thereby nudging does not ban options (e. 
g., removing the grey energy from the market) or significantly increase 
the options’ costs (e.g., making grey energy very expensive). Although 
nudges have proven to be extremely effective in a variety of areas, such 
as the energy industry, the characteristics of successful nudges are still 
being discussed. According to the EAST framework (Halpern, 2015), one 
characteristic of successful nudges is that they need to be simple. 
Meaning that no great effort is required on the consumer side to 
implement the desired behavior. 
Nowadays, switching to or buying a solar energy product is not easy. 
It requires a process consisting of several complex steps (understanding 
one’s own energy bill, comparing possible suppliers, etc.), and is also 
associated with a few uncertainties (how much it costs more). Due to 
these difficulties, it seems to be too big a step for many consumers to 
actively switch to a solar energy product. We need to think about how 
we can more easily persuade consumers to buy solar power, perhaps in 
smaller, more affordable units, because Farhar (1999) was able to show 
that the willingness to pay for renewable energy varies greatly from 
person to person. By making solar energy not only easier to acquire, but 
also available in different sizes, we can help to ensure that everyone 
(including those with small budgets) can somehow participate in energy 
transition. 
How this could be done has been shown in aviation. It is difficult, or 
almost impossible, to get people to give up flying (see the gap in pas-
senger behavior, see Davison et al., 2014), yet airlines (e.g., British 
Airways in 2005) offer programs to offset CO2 emissions and thereby 
passenger can make their flight more sustainable. In such programs 
customers are asked, by means of a simple opt-in procedure when 
booking a flight, whether they would like to purchase carbon offsets. 
Though they still fly, they make a small contribution to reducing the 
carbon footprint. On top of that this contribution is affordable for most 
customers. The height of offset depends thereby on the specific flight. 
For example, a one-way flight from Zurich to London would produce on 
average 186 kg CO2, which can be compensated by buying a certificate 
for CHF 5.- (around 5$; Myclimate, 2020). 
This led us to wonder whether we could offer consumers something 
similar to the “carbon offsetting” in the energy sector. Hence, the “solar 
certificate” is offered to the consumers while buying an electrical 
appliance in an electronics or online shop. Depending on the selected 
solar certificate duration (e.g., 1 year), the appliance is supplied with 
solar power2 for that period. Besides the fact that such appliance-based 
solar certificates are affordable to everybody and easy to acquire, they 
offer some other benefits. 
First, they could foster knowledge about the appliance’s actual 
electricity use as well as the additional price of solar energy (e.g., 
charging my phone with solar electricity for a year costs only 1.- CHF in 
addition). Second, research (Kogut and Ritov, 2005) on donation 
behavior has shown that people are willing to spend more money on a 
few personalized victims than on a large number of unidentified victims. 
Applied to our context, this could mean that people are willing to pay 
more for a few specific appliances than for several unspecific energy 
guzzlers once a month (as if by changing the home’s electricity product). 
Finally, with appliance-based solar certificates, consumers can support 
small local solar electricity cooperatives (which slightly increases WTP; 
Sagebiel et al., 2014) and thus achieve a population-based (grassroot 
movement) energy transition. 
Given that we use such certificates, how much would customers be 
willing to pay for them? Here Brouwer et al. (2008) have shown that 
travelers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for airlines’ carbon offsetting pro-
grams varies from continent to continent and correlates, among other 
things, with travelers’ awareness of the environmental impact of flying. 
Furthermore, WTP seems to depend on the income of the traveler (i.e. 
customers are willing to pay up to 2.36% of their income; see Brouwer 
et al., 2008) and on the flight distance. Whereby longer flight results in a 
higher WTP (i.e., up to 0.6 cents per km). Accordingly, the price of a 
solar certificate should be higher for appliances that consume a lot of 
energy. However, we assume that energy consumption cannot be the 
only factor determining price, but also the price of the appropriate 
appliance. This would be in contrast to the calculation of the price of 
carbon offsetting, which is determined “solely” by the flight distance. 
This is because both the carbon offset price and the ticket price depend 
on the flight distance. However, this is not the case when it comes to the 
energy consumption of appliances: a cheap appliance (e.g. a kettle) can 
consume considerably more electricity (72 kWh per year) than an 
expensive appliance (e.g. a smartphone consumes about 4 kWh per 
year). The participants’ WTP therefore will, assumedly, be an interac-
tion between appliance prices and energy consumption. 
To sum up, the aim of the studies described below is to investigate 
whether appliance-based solar certificates are purchased by consumers 
based on how factors such as the price of the appliance influence that 
decision. We, therefore, designed a series of experiments in which, after 
a fictitious purchase of an appliance, participants were asked whether 
they would buy a solar certificate for this appliance and of what 
duration. 
Thereby Study 1 examines how the price and energy consumption of the 
appliance (e.g., a toothbrush) influences the purchase of a solar certifi-
cate. Study 2 examines how different product promotions (e.g. a discount) 
change the purchase pattern of solar certificates observed in Study 1. In 
the final Study 3, we examined whether participants who bought a solar 
certificate subsequently behaved in a less environmentally friendly 
2 For calculation details see method part of Study 1. 
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manner, that is, do not buy a solar powered product. In the concluding 
discussion, the results of the studies are summarized and compared with 
a similar approach, the climate protection programs of the airlines, and 
political implications are described. 
2. Study 1 
In our first study we investigated how the price and the energy con-
sumption of appliances influence the choice of an appliance-based solar 
certificate and its WTP. 
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Participants 
424 participants from the ZHAW Zurich University of Applied Sci-
ences and the greater area of Zurich took part in this web-based study. 
Their age ranged from 18 to 53 (M = 26.2; SD = 6.3), whereas 69.1% 
were female. All participants gave informed consent. As an incentive, 
participants could take part in a draw for cinema coupons respectively 
students of the School of Applied Psychology could receive course credit 
instead (which 14.2% overall did). 
2.1.2. Stimulus material, procedure and design 
At the beginning of Study 1, participants were told – as part of the 
cover story – that they had just bought an electrical appliance (e.g., a 
toothbrush) in an online shop and that the shop offers them a solar 
certificate for this appliance. It was then the task of the participants, in 
the so-called solar choice certificate task, to decide whether they wanted 
to buy this solar certificate or not, and if so, with what term (1-year or 3- 
year; defining the variable term). The four electrical appliances that 
could be presented to the participants, each represent an instance of the 
following factor level combination: price (low/high) x energy consump-
tion (low/moderate). The toothbrush, for example, is a low-priced, low 
energy consumption appliance. Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the four possible combinations or (appliance) conditions (see 
Fig. 1)3. 
Regarding the solar certificate, participants were informed about 
how the certificate works, that is how the solar electricity purchased is 
fed into the Swiss grid, respectively that this is guaranteed by the cer-
tificate. Furthermore, participants were informed about which cooper-
ative is behind the solar certificate and that the price of the certificate is 
calculated as follows: The yearly energy consumption of the appliance 
(kWh/annum) multiplied with the cost of the solar electricity4 (CHF/ 
kWh) plus a small profit for the cooperative. Hence, for appliances with 
a low energy consumption (toothbrush and mobile) the price was CHF 
1.- for the 1-year term and CHF 3.- for the 3-year term, respectively for 
appliances with a medium energy consumption (kettle and vacuum 
cleaner) CHF 6.- for the 1-year term and CHF 18.- for the 3-year term. 
After the participants had completed the solar certificate choice task 
they had to answer a number of questions, such as: the willingness to pay 
(WTP) for a solar certificate (in % of the appliance price), the personal 
relevance of a solar certificate (7-point Likert scale), the simplicity of the 
purchasing process (also 7-point Likert scale), whether the solar certif-
icate was comprehensible (yes or no). In order to check whether the last 
question - out of laziness - was not just answered with yes or no, 
comprehensibility was assessed with additional questions (e.g., “by 
purchasing the solar certificate, additional solar power is directly fed 
into the socket of my home”). At the end of the study participants had to 
answer some socio-demographic questions (e.g., income, age, sex). 
2.2. Results 
From the 461 participants who completed the experiment, 37 par-
ticipants had to be excluded from the further analysis. Twenty-two of 
them because they needed less than 150 or more than 1800 s for 
completing the study; another 14 participants because they needed less 
than 10 s or more than 300 s for the solar certificate choice task. 
Furthermore, one participant inserted “199” as age and was therefore 
excluded. 
2.2.1. Solar certificate choice task 
2.2.1.1. Overall model. Statistical analyses were performed using R 
Statistical Software. First, we calculated a multinomial logistic regres-
sion with Price and Energy consumption as the independent variables 
for the term chosen. We thereby found a significant main effect of En-
ergy consumption, χ2 (2) = 28.23, p < .001, as well as a significant 
interaction effect of Price x Energy consumption, χ2 (2) = 8.44, p < .05, 
but no significant main effect of Price χ2 (2) = 4.26, p = .12 (see Fig. 2). 
2.2.1.2. Detailed analysis. Descriptive statistics showed that 20.3% of 
the participants, did choose not to buy a solar certificate, while 20.5% 
did choose to buy a certificate with a 1-year term respectively 59.2% a 3- 
year term. 
Thereby, pairwise comparisons (with the Least-Square Means 
method; Tukey adjusted5) showed, that the estimated probabilities of 
participants that chose to buy no certificate (”0 Term [in Years]” in 
Fig. 2 or our so-called reference point) did not significantly differ from 
those for the 1-year term.6 However, compared to the reference point a 
significant increase in the number of participants that chose to buy a 
certificate with a 3-year term for all appliances was found (electric 
toothbrush; t (8) = 7.80, p < .001, smart phone; t (8) = 8.23, p < .001, 
vacuum cleaner; t (8) = 5.35, p < .01; with the exception of the electric 
kettle, t (8) = 0.22, p = 1.00).7 
With regard to the 3-year term, we wondered which factor combi-
nation (i.e., which appliance) was the most chosen one? Pairwise com-
parisons showed, that the probability of choosing a 3-year term was 
higher for the toothbrush (t (8) = 5.59, p < .01) and the mobile (t (8) =
4.68, p < .05) than for the kettle. However, the vacuum cleaner did not 
differ from the kettle condition; t (8) = 3.51, p = .09. 
2.2.2. Questions 
Willingness to pay. Most participants (73%) did not only show a 
willingness to pay for an appliance-based solar certificate, but also up to 
13% (SD = 10, Min = 1, Max = 90) of the appliance price. 
Acceptance and understanding of the certificate. The partici-
pants considered the solar certificate as personally relevant (M = 4.62, 
SD = 2.00) as well as simple to purchase (M = 5.34, SD = 1.72). 
Furthermore, 70% of the participants thought that they had understood 
the solar certificate; this was supported by our data, showing that in the 
mean per control question 75% of the participants answered them 
correctly. 
2.3. Discussion 
Overall, Study 1 showed that about 80% of the participants bought a 
solar certificate, 20% of them a 1-year certificate and about 60% even a 
3 Note, the pictures from the original studies differed slightly from the ones 
depicted here. The original pictures cannot be depicted do to copyright reasons.  
4 0.07 CHF/kWh at the time of the study. 
5 If not stated otherwise we used Tukey adjusted tests for all pair-wise 
comparisons in all studies. In the first study the correction was for 30 planed 
contrasts.  
6 All pair-wise comparisons between term 0 and 1 were not significant (all 
p’s > 0.68).  
7 All pair-wise comparisons between term 1 and 3 were significant (all p’s <
0.05), with exception of the kettle; t(8) = 1.19, p = .92. 
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3-year certificate; only in the case of the kettle was the certificate with 
the 3-year term chosen less frequently. Compared to the number of 
passengers who buy a climate protection program, our numbers are 
definitely higher (e.g., 10% in the case of Quantas Airways,8 see Freed, 
2016). The critical point for/against buying a solar certificate with a 
3-year term seems to be the level of the “solar certificate price/appliance 
price” ratio. From the answers out of the “willingness to pay” question, 
we assume that this level lies somewhere around 13%. The kettle 
exceeded this level (CHF 18.-/CHF 59.- = 31%) and hence was bought 
less often. Overall the solar certificate seems to be of personal relevance, 
simple enough to buy, and easily understood. 
3. Study 2 
In Study 2, we wanted to further investigate whether buying a solar 
certificate is actually determined by the “solar certificate price/appli-
ance price” ratio. Furthermore, we wanted to investigate the effects of 
product promotions, not with regard to the purchase of the promoted 
product itself, but with regard to the later purchase of a solar certificate. 
As there is, to our knowledge, no such research, we drew our conclusions 
regarding the expected effect based on research on the effects of pur-
chasing the promoted product itself. It is known that price reductions – as 
the most typical example of a promotion – lead to an increase in sales for 
each type of product (e.g., a TV; see for an overview Gedenk et al., 
2006). However, do promotions also have a beneficial effect if the 
promoted product is not, for example, a TV but a donation to a charity 
organization and is thus associated with social value creation9 or 
pro-social behavior, when viewed at the individual rather than the 
company level? Not according to Newman and Shen (2012). Their 
participants donated less money to a charity organization when they got 
a promotion in the form of a (free) thank you gift. Back to our situation 
where, unlike in the study by Newman and Shen (2012), the promotion 
is not on the target product (here: solar certificate), but on the appliance 
(i.e. the kettle). Are their results nevertheless transferable, in the sense 
that product promotions will have a negative effect on the purchase of 
solar certificates, since the later behavior can also be regarded as 
prosocial? 
To compare the results of Study 2 with those of the first study, we 
again use the kettle as a reference appliance, but add two new “appli-
ances”: LED-Lightbulbs and a TV. 
Fig. 1. The appliances in the different conditions in study 1. 
Note. The presented appliances had two characteristics: energy consumption (low/medium) and price (low/high). 
Fig. 2. Choice probabilities in study 1. 
Note. The estimated probabilities to choose a certificate for each of the three 
certificate terms depending on the factors price and energy consumption 
are shown. 
8 Please note that our participants did not really have to make the payment 
compared to the Quantas example. This could explain the difference. 
9 We use the term social value creation here for any behavior that creates 
value for the environment (in nature and society) as for example, donate to a 
charity or reduce one’s own greenhouse gas emissions. 
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718 participants from the ZHAW Zurich University of Applied Sci-
ences and the greater area of Zurich took part in this web-based 
experiment. Their age ranged from 18 to 51 (M = 24.3; SD = 4.8), 
whereas 62.5% were female. All participants gave informed consent. As 
an incentive, participants could take part in a draw for two iPads 
respectively students of the School of Applied Psychology could receive 
course credit instead (which 1.8% overall did). 
3.1.2. Stimulus material, procedure and design 
The set-up of Study 2 was identical to the first study with the 
following two exceptions: First, in addition to the kettle (inexpensive, 
but with medium energy consumption), participants were presented 
with either a set of ten LED Lightbulbs (inexpensive, but with a high 
energy consumption), or a TV (expensive and with high energy con-
sumption). Second, the appliance could be presented with no promotion 
(“regular” condition) or with one of the two following promotions: 
Either with a discount price of CHF 5.- or 10.-, depending on whether the 
price for the 1-year solar certificate for that appliance was CHF 5.- or 
10.- (discount condition) or with a “free” 1-year solar certificate 
included (of either CHF 5 or 10; solar certificate [included] condition). 
Participants were again randomly assigned to one of the 9 conditions 
that resulted from the combination of the following 2 factors: Appliances 
(Kettle, LED, TV) and Promotion (regular, discount, solar certificate; see 
Fig. 3). 
As before, after the participants had completed the solar certificate 
choice task, they had to answer a number of questions. Whereby some 
questions, such as whether they would also be willing to buy a solar 
certificate for other appliances (yes or no) and if so, for how many 
(number) or why (simple selection from 7 possible reasons given10), 
were only given to those participants who had decided to buy a solar 
certificate. The same was true for the question of how much money (in 
CHF) they would spend in total on solar certificates. Further questions 
such the optimal duration of a solar certificate (individual selection from 
8 possibilities11) and the socio-demographic questions (e.g., income, 
age, gender) were given to all participants. 
3.2. Results 
From the 751 participants who completed the study, 33 participants 
were excluded from further analysis. Fourteen of them because they 
needed less than 120 or more than 1800 s for completing the study; 
another eighteen participants because they needed less than 10 s or 
more than 300 s for the critical solar certificate choice task. One 
participant was excluded because of presumably entering the year of 
birth instead of the age. 
3.2.1. Solar certificate choice task 
3.2.1.1. Overall model. As in Study 1, we calculated a multinomial lo-
gistic regression with Appliance and Promotion as predictors for the 
term chosen. We thereby found a significant main effect for Appliance, 
χ2 (4) = 12.50, p < .05 as well as Promotion χ2 (4) = 10.34, p < .05, but 
no significant Appliance × Promotion interaction effect, χ2 (8) = 7.23, p 
= .51. Since there was no significant difference between the regular 
condition and the discount condition, χ2 (2) = 0.38, p = .83, they were 
hereafter consider as one, the R&D condition. 
3.2.1.2. Detailed analysis. Descriptive analysis showed that partici-
pants’ choosing probabilities were equally divided between buying no 
solar certificate (30.9%), the 1-year term (33.7%) and the 3-year term 
solar certificate (35.4%). 
Thereby, pairwise comparisons12 showed that in each condition the 
estimated probabilities of participants who did not buy a certificate 
(again our reference point) did not significantly differ from those who 
bought a 1-year term certificate (all p’s > 0.80; see Fig. 4). However, 
compared to the reference point, only participants in the TV and R&D 
condition, t (8) = 4.62, p < .05, but not in any other condition (all p’s >
0.22)13 did buy, significantly more often, a certificate with a 3-year 
term. As in Study 1, when the ratio “solar certificate price/appliance 
price” became too high, participants seemed no longer to be willing to 
buy the certificate. 
With regard to the 3-year term, we found – within the R&D condition 
– no differences between the three appliances (the LED – TV comparison 
is marginally significant; t (8) = 4.29, p = .053; the other comparisons: 
p’s > 0.39); the same pattern was found for the solar certificate condi-
tion (the LED – TV comparison is marginally significant; t (8) = 4.16, p =
.062; the other comparisons: p’s > 0.41). Interestingly, however, the 
probability of participants buying a solar certificate was significantly 
lower in the solar certificate condition than in the R&D certificate 
condition for every appliance (Kettle t (8) = 4.59, p < .05, LED t (8) =
4.55, p < .05, and TV t (8) = 4.58, p < .05).14 
3.2.2. Questions 
Solar certificates for other appliances. Of the participants that did 
choose to buy a certificate, 91% indicated that they would buy certifi-
cates for other appliances (on average for another 4.68 appliances, SD =
6.49, Min = 1, Max = 100). The reason for this was mostly (84%) the 
promotion of environmentally friendly electricity. Furthermore, partic-
ipants were willing to annually pay on average CHF 110.56 (SD =
142.50, Min = 5, Max = 1000) for solar certificates. 
Preferred duration of the certificate. 43% of all participants would 
prefer a certificate for the average lifetime of appliances, 20% for a 1- 
year term, 10% a 2-year term, 10% a 3-year term, 8% a 4, 5- or 10- 
years term. 7% of the participants stated that none of the listed dura-
tions is suitable for them. 
3.3. Discussion 
Study 2 not only replicates the results of the first study that with an 
increasing “solar certificate price/appliance price” ratio the 3-year term 
certificate is chosen less frequently (see kettle and LED) but also shows a 
broad support for the solar certificate (seen in the number of solar cer-
tificates they would buy for additional appliances, etc.). Furthermore, 
promotions seem to have a differential effect on choice. The regular 
price and the discount promotion thereby seemed to have an advantage 
(in “term 3”) over the solar certificate promotions. The question is, why 
did those solar certificate promotions backfire? 
10 The 7 Reasons were: “the price of the solar certificate is appropriate”, “the 
duration I prefer is provided”, “the purchase is easy”, “I have a bad conscience”, 
“I would like to support environmental-friendly electricity”, “I don’t know” or 
“other reason”.  
11 The 8 possibilities were: “1 year”, “2 years”, “3 years”, “4 years”, “5 years”, 
“10 years”, “average lifetime of the appliance” and “none of the listed lifetimes 
conforms my wishes”. 
12 As in the first study we used Tukey adjusted tests for all planed (overall 63) 
pair-wise comparisons.  
13 All pair-wise comparisons between term 1 and 3 within the promotion 
conditions were not significant (all p’s > 0.38), with exception of the TV in the 
R&D condition, t(8) = 4.85, p < .05 and the LED in the certificate condition, t 
(8) = 5.06, p < .05.  
14 The probabilities to choose a 1 year did not differ within the appliances for 
the promotions (all p’s > 0.21). 
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4. Study 3 
In the study by Khan and Dhar (2006) participants had to choose 
between two equally expensive items, this after a group of participants (as 
opposed to a control group) was instructed to imagine that they had just 
displayed an altruistic behavior (such as weekly volunteer work in a 
community service). One item (e.g., designer jeans) was of hedonistic 
nature, that is, there to satisfy sensual pleasure. The other item (e.g., 
vacuum cleaner) was of utilitarian nature, that is, there to satisfy a basic 
need. The authors found that if the participants had previously displayed 
altruistic behavior, they were much more likely to choose the designer 
jeans, the luxury article, than the participants in the control group. The 
phenomenon that after an altruistic behavior (here; through imagina-
tion), a hedonistic behavior is shown is summarized under the term 
“moral self-licensing effect” (for an overview see Merritt et al., 2010).15 
This phenomenon may well explain the behavior observed in our Study 
2: If a promotion included a “free” solar certificate (social value 
creation) for a 1-year term, participants were less willing to buy another 
certificate with a 3-year term. The question is, can we find this effect also 
in a broader context? More specifically, do people who just bought a 
solar certificate behave subsequently less environmentally-friendly, 
such as by not buying a solar electricity product? 
4.1. Method 
4.1.1. Participants 
675 participants from the ZHAW Zurich University of Applied Sci-
ences and the greater area of Zurich took part in this web-based 
experiment. Their age ranged from 18 to 52 (M = 25.1; SD = 4.8), 
whereas 62.5% were female. All participants gave informed consent. As 
an incentive, participants could take part in a draw for one iPad and 2 
cinema coupons respectively students of the School of Applied Psy-
chology could receive course credit instead (which 4.6% overall did). 
4.1.2. Stimulus material, procedure and design 
The set-up of Study 3 was identical to the first study with the 
following three exceptions: First, participants were only presented with 
one appliance: a TV. We, however manipulated the price of the TV, 
which could be either moderate (399.- CHF) or high (799.- CHF). Using 
the TV as stimulus material enabled us to set the price of the solar cer-
tificate at a level that is within the range of an annual subscription to 
solar energy (for the reason see exception number 3). Second, we did 
split up the former triple-level dependent variable (no certificate, a 1- 
year term and a 3-year term solar certificate) into 3 double-level or bi-
nary dependent variables (yes/no; see Fig. 5 for the possible combina-
tions). For example, participants in the “1 Year” condition could choose 
between a certificate for 1-year or no certificate. Instead of the 3-year 
term we used in two levels a lifetime certificate choice, one cheap 
(47.- CHF, for a highly energy efficiency TV) and one expensive (95.- 
CHF, for an energy inefficient TV). On top of that, we added a control 
group that did not get the solar choice certificate task. Third, we added a 
second task (solar energy product choice task) wherein the participants 
received the cover story that one month after their purchase in the on-
line shop they will be offered an annual subscription (for 105.- CHF) for 
solar energy. They could accept this offer or not (yes/no answer). 
Participants were again randomly assigned to one of the 8 conditions 
that resulted from the combination of the following 2 factors: Price 
(moderate, high) x Solar Certificate Option (1 year, lifetime cheap, 
Fig. 3. The different conditions in study 2.  
Fig. 4. Choice probabilities in study 2. 
Note. The estimated probabilities to choose a certificate for each of the three 
certificate options depending on the factors Promotion (Certificate and R&D =
Regular & Discount combined) and Appliance (Kettle, LED, TV) are shown. 
15 There are two theoretical models explaining the moral self-licensing effect. 
Either it is seen as a kind of moral credit system, whereby virtuous behaviors 
deposit and hedonic withdraw from the moral bank account (see Nisan and 
Horenczyk, 1990). On the other hand the moral credential model which argues 
that “past behavior serves as a lens through which one construes current 
behavior” (Merritt et al., 2010, p. 349). 
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lifetime expensive, control group; for details see Fig. 5). 
After the participants had completed the second task (respectively 
the first one for the control group), the solar energy product choice task, 
they again had to answer a number of questions such as whether they 
would buy a solar certificate for an appliance at all (yes/no), and if so, 
how much they would be willing to pay for an appliance-based solar 
certificate for a 1-year term and for a lifetime term of the appliance (in % 
of the price of the appliance). Furthermore, they were asked what kind 
of energy product they have at home (mixed [partly from fossil or nu-
clear sources], green or solar energy or “don’t know”). Last, but not 
least, we did ask some demographic questions and did check with a 
control question (hidden in a matrix-question whereby participants 
were instructed to click on a specific value) if participants did pay 
attention to the tasks at hand. 
4.2. Results 
From the 719 participants who regularly completed the experiment, 
44 participants were excluded from further analysis. 13 because they did 
not answer the control question correctly, 2 because they participated 
twice in the experiment and 21 participants because they needed less 
than 120 or more than 1800 s for completing the experiment respec-
tively 8 because they needed less than 5 s or more than 300 s for one of 
the two critical decisions (solar certificate choice task or solar energy 
choice task). 
4.2.1. Solar certificate choice task 
4.2.1.1. Overall model. We calculated a logistic regression with Price 
and Certificate as independent variables for the term chosen (i.e., a 
certificate with a term of a certain length/no certificate). We thereby 
found a significant main effect for Certificate, χ2 (2) = 8.33, p < .05, but 
not a significant main effect for Price χ2 (1) = 0.61, p = .44, nor a sig-
nificant Price × Certificate interaction χ2 (2) = 2.61, p = .27. Therefore 
price was not considered as a separate factor anymore in the further 
analysis. 
4.2.1.2. Detailed analysis. Descriptive analysis shows that overall 
73.2% of the participants did choose to buy a solar certificate. 
Furthermore, comparisons (using Wald tests; see Fig. 6) showed that the 
cheap lifetime certificate (independent of the TVs price) was chosen 
more often than the expensive lifetime certificate (β = 0.75; χ2 (2) =
8.94, p < .01); the comparison with the 1 year certificate, however, was 
only marginally significant (β = 0.47; χ2 (2) = 3.28, p = .07). Between 
the expensive lifetime certificate and the 1 year certificate there was no 
significant difference (β = 0.28; χ2 (2) = 1.37, p = .24). 
Fig. 5. The different conditions in study 3. 
Note. In the control group participants did not take part in the solar certificate choice task. 
Fig. 6. Choice probabilities in study 3 for the certificate task.  
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4.2.2. Questions 
Willingness to pay. 68.3% of the participants stated that they would 
buy an appliance-based certificate; for a 1 year certificate they would 
pay up to 17.9% (SD = 16.3), for the lifelong certificate up to 35.3% (SD 
= 21.7) of the appliance price. Note, participants are willing to pay 
significantly more for a lifetime certificate; t (343) = 20.84, p < .001. 
4.2.3. Solar energy product choice task 
4.2.3.1. Overall model. Here we also calculated a logistic regression 
with Price and Certificate as independent variables on (solar energy) 
product choice (yes/no). We thereby found neither significant main 
effects (Certificate, χ2 (3) = 2.41, p = .49; Price χ2 (1) = 0.77, p = .38), 
nor a significant Price × Certificate interaction effect, χ2 (3) = 2.94, p =
.40. 
Moral Self-Licensing Effect. The important question, however, is 
whether the choice pattern in this second choice task differs depending 
on what the participants have chosen in the first, the solar certificate 
choice task. This shows us whether an altruistic behavior will result in a 
less environmentally friendly behavior, such as not buying the solar 
energy product. We again calculated a logistic regression with Certifi-
cate and Choice1 (i.e., the choice in the solar certificate choice task) as 
independent variables on product choice (yes/no).16 We thereby found a 
significant main effect of Choice1, χ2 (1) = 34.53, p < .001; the other 
main as well as the interaction were not significant; Certificate; χ2 (2) =
4.47, p = .11; Choice1 x Certificate χ2 (2) = 4.88, p = .09. 
4.2.3.2. Detailed analysis. The descriptive analysis showed that a total 
of 65.3% of the participants chose the solar energy product (i.e., 64.8% 
of the participants in the groups that received the solar certificate task, 
67.1% in the control group – dotted line in Fig. 7). Regarding the groups 
that received the task with the solar certificate, it was found that in the 
cases where the participants had bought a certificate, 75.0% of them 
also bought the solar energy product. However, if the participants had 
not bought the certificate, only 36.8% of them bought the solar energy 
product. 
Post-hoc comparisons using Pearson chi-square tests with Bonferroni 
correction were calculated to more thoroughly understand the pattern of 
the solar energy product choices. Thereby, we saw that there was no 
significant difference between the control group and any average of any 
of the other groups regarding the number of solar energy products 
bought: χ2 (1) = 0.09, p = .77. Similarly, participants in the control did 
not significantly buy more or less products when compared to any of the 
three groups that did buy a solar certificate in the first choice task (all χ2 
< 4.00, all p > .45). However, when the participants in the control were 
compared to each one of the three groups that did not buy a solar cer-
tificate in the first choice task, we see a significant difference in each 
comparison: 1 year: χ2 (1) = 24.72, p < .001, life cheap: χ2 (1) = 7.92, p 
< .05, or life expensive: χ2 (1) = 7.98, p < .05 (for an overview, see 
Fig. 7). 
Comparison of the 3 vs. 2 option choice set. Which choice set size, 
that with three (e.g., Study 1 or 2) or two (Study 3) options is more 
beneficial regarding selling solar certificates? To answer that question, 
we compared the number of choices in Study 2 (i.e., the “regular” TV) 
where participants could chose the 1 or 3 years certificate (which 79.5% 
did) with the number of choices for the 1 year certificate in Study 3 
(where 72.2% of the participants did choose it). The proportion test, 
however, showed no significant difference, χ2 (1) = 1.18, p = .28. 
Electricity product at home. 42.5% of the participants seem to 
have an energy product that contains nuclear or fossil power. 16.6% of 
the participants have an energy product that contains 100% renewable 
energy respectively 6.1% have a product containing 100% solar energy. 
34.8% of the participants did not know what kind of an energy product 
they have at home. 
4.3. Discussion 
The results of Study 3 indicate that even with a binary choice set, 
quite a high number participants do buy an appliance-based solar cer-
tificate. Thereby the price of the TV had no effect on the choice of the 
solar certificate (first choice) nor on the solar product (second choice). 
Moreover, results indicate that participants did buy shorter 1-year cer-
tificates as often as lifelong certificates: whereby regarding the later, 
more were sold when the appliance was energy efficient (expensive life) 
than when not (cheap life). Therefore, in the case of the lifetime cer-
tificates, participants accepted certificates that cost significantly – 
namely 9 times – more than the 1-year certificates. This result is backed- 
up with the results from the explicit question about participants will-
ingness to pay for lifelong certificates in general, where participants 
stated that they are willing to pay on average up to 35% of the price of 
the appliance. Furthermore, the behavior of the participants that did buy 
a solar certificate (hedonic first choice) did differ from the behavior of 
the participants that did not buy a solar certificate (virtuosic first choice) 
regarding the percentage of buying a solar energy product (second 
choice). This is contradictory to the moral self-licensing effect, but in 
line with theories that assume that people tend to act consistent over 
time (see for an overview; Gawronski and Strack, 2012). 
Though it is still debated under which circumstances people will 
show consistent or inconsistent behavior. The few moderator variables 
discussed so far in studies (see Mullen and Monin, 2016; Merritt et al., 
2010) cannot explain (or even contradict; see “Construal Level Theory” 
in Mullen and Monin, 2016) why in our study the participants showed 
consistent behavior, but not in the mentioned studies (e.g., Khan and 
Dhar, 2006; Tiefenbeck et al., 2013). 
Last but not least, our results indicate that a high number of partic-
ipants were not aware of the energy product they have. This is a result 
that can also been found in other studies (e.g., Kühne et al., 2020) and is 
indicative of the low involvement of people in the energy product. 
5. Conclusion and policy implications 
In three studies, we investigated whether appliance-based solar 
certificates can persuade consumers to buy more solar energy, respec-
tively what exactly these certificates should look like. 
Overall, those certificates were often chosen (i.e., chosen to be 
bought) by the participants. The first study thereby showed that the 
“solar certificate price/appliance price” ratio mattered. The energy 
consumption of the appliance seemed not to be relevant. The second 
Fig. 7. Choice probabilities in study 3 for the solar product choice task. 
Note. The estimated probabilities to choose a solar product (second choice) 
predicted by the factors first choice (appliance-based certificate) are shown. 
The dotted horizontal line indicates the reference group which did not see a 
first choice. 
16 The control group is of course not included in this analysis. 
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study showed that a monetary discount on the appliance itself did not 
change the before (Study 1) observed pattern; whereas a promotion that 
includes a free certificate does: fewer participants chose to buy the 
certificate. The third study showed the robustness of the observed 
pattern: changing the size of the choice set did not change anything. 
Furthermore, there seem to be no negative long-term consequences from 
buying a certificate: participants that did chose to buy a solar energy 
certificate did not less often buy a solar electricity product as the one 
that did not have the option to buy a solar energy certificate. 
Our results thus show that buying a certificate was easy. This was one 
of the basic requirements to create successful nudges (see Halpern, 
2015). Another “requirement” that could probably have worked in our 
favor, and which is part of the EAST framework (Halpern, 2015), is the 
social factor. Man is a deeply social being and is therefore constantly 
influenced by other people. In that vein, Gerpott and Mahmudova 
(2010) have shown that when we believe that our own social environ-
ment, such as our friends and family, would support the switch to green 
energy, more of us make that switch. Hence, the social environment 
makes us act in a more environmentally-friendly way by making us put 
our “good intentions” into practice. However, our social environment 
can make us change our behavior by creating a sense of guilt, for 
example, by not acting green enough (see Nyborg et al., 2006). This was 
induced by a Swedish social norm called “flygskam” or “flight shame” 
(which, by the way, resulted from increased environmental awareness) 
with the goal to encourage people to fly less. Its success is reflected in a 4 
percent decline in passenger flights in 2019 (Swedavia, 2020), and also a 
reported increase in the number of carbon offsets bought (Gross et al., 
2019). Similarly, our certificates could probably also reduce such a 
feeling of guilt by adding an option to behave altruistically in the 
moment of consumption. 
Of course, overall it would be better for the environment if people 
would not fly, consume less (e.g., energy), and switch entirely to 
renewable energies, but we think it is important to offer alternative, 
albeit smaller, steps (like the carbon-offset programs) towards envi-
ronmentally friendly behavior in order to involve as many people as 
possible in the energy transition. 
The solar certificate also provides policy makers with an instrument 
with which they can change people’s decision-making in ways other 
than the traditional ones, for example by banning or introducing taxes 
on grey energy. Another example is that policy makers can encourage 
retailers to offer these certificates as optional extras on their appliances. 
This would be similar to the food sector where the Swiss government is 
currently encouraging retailers to voluntarily place the Nutri-Score food 
label on their food products to combat obesity. Since, in the case of 
appliance-based solar certificates, retailers receive a small portion of the 
retail price of the certificate for their services, it should be possible to 
find retailers who offer them voluntarily. However, the sale of solar 
certificates is only seen as another instrument to promote the purchase 
of solar electricity and should therefore be accompanied by other 
interventions. 
Nonetheless, solar certificates could involve people in the energy 
transition and thus help in the fight against climate change. Next step 
would be to implement the solar certificate in a real world setting by, for 
example, placing them at a check-out of an online shop selling different 
appliances. 
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